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Abstract
We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund man-
agers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund's absolute performance and its perfor-
mance relative to rival funds. Investors choose whether or not to delegate their invest-
ment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose the parameters of
the optimal contract subject to the fund manager's participation constraint. We ¯nd
that the impact of relative performance evaluation on the equilibrium equity premium
and on portfolio herding critically depends on whether the participation constraint is
binding. Simple numerical examples suggest that the increased importance of delegation
and relative performance evaluation may lower the equity premium.
Keywords: portfolio delegation, relative performance evaluation, equity premium
JEL Classi¯cation: G11, G12, G23.
1. Introduction
The explosive growth of the asset management industry during the 1990s1 was accom-
panied by a growing trend towards performance-based remuneration for fund managers.
Given that stock markets performed rather well over this period, the absolute return on a
managed fund was not a reliable measure of managerial ability. In this environment, re-
munerating fund managers on the basis of their relative performance became increasingly
attractive. Other things being equal, a fund manager should be paid more if he `beats
the market' or performs better than his peers. Contracts based on relative performance
evaluation (RPE) provide incentives for managers to perform well, while stripping away
the uncertainty common to all investment funds.
While there is a substantial literature on the impact of performance-based contracts
on portfolio choice,2 their implication for asset market equilibrium is poorly understood.
In this paper we aim to analyze the equilibrium consequences of performance-based con-
tracts in a simple model of portfolio choice. We consider a two-period model in which
investors allocate their wealth across two assets: riskless bonds and risky equity shares.
An investor can invest directly in these assets or delegate the portfolio choice to a pro-
fessional fund manager. Delegation incurs fees, so is rational only if its bene¯ts justify
the costs. In our model, fund managers have access to better information about the
relative returns of the two assets. If investors opt to delegate, they choose the optimal
performance-based fee structures to remunerate fund managers. We allow managerial
remuneration to be a linear function of their absolute and relative performances, and to
include a ¯xed component that is independent of performance. Both classes of agents
{ investors and fund managers { are assumed to be risk-averse. Investors choose their
investment strategy to maximize the expected utility of their returns net of any dele-
gation fees. Fund managers choose portfolios to maximize the expected utility of their
remuneration. Our interest lies in analyzing the equilibrium outcome, where asset prices
are determined through market clearing.
We ¯nd that fund managers' portfolio choices typically undo the incentive e®ects of
relative performance evaluation in linear contracts. If so, does relative performance eval-
uation matter? In our model delegating investors choose delegation contracts to provide
the right incentives to fund managers, subject to a standard participation constraint.
If delegating investors can choose the parameters of the linear contract optimally, rela-
tive performance evaluation serves a limited purpose. While the use of RPE contracts
is not sub-optimal for investors it does not necessarily improve on outcomes obtained
through other contracts based on absolute performance alone. However, in reality the
set of feasible contracts may be somewhat restricted. Consider, for instance, a plausible
requirement that the ¯xed component of managerial remuneration cannot be negative.
1Mamaysky and Spiegel (2001) report that the number of equity funds registered in the US rose from
785 in 1990 to 11,882 by 2000, while total net assets under management in equity funds grew from $296
billion to $5.81 trillion by 2000, an almost twenty-fold increase. By comparison, over the same period,
the number of equities listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ grew from 6,635 to 8,435, an increase
of 27%.
2See, e.g., Bhattacharya and P°eiderer (1985), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Das and Sundaram
(2002), Maug and Naik (1996), Admati and P°eiderer (1997), and Bhattacharya (1999).
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When this restriction poses a binding constraint, so that the chosen contract is only
constrained-optimal, relative performance evaluation matters. With constrained-optimal
contracts, the weight placed on RPE a®ects the demand of risky assets in delegated port-
folios and hence the equilibrium equity premium. These e®ects are driven by equilibrium
conditions and could not be uncovered outside the type of model we analyse here.
We also ¯nd that, even with `fully-optimal' linear contracts, delegated portfolios are
likely to have larger demand for the risky asset than if investors were to invest directly.
There are two reasons for this. One, performance-based delegation contracts entail risk
sharing between investors and fund managers: to the extent delegating investors bear only
a part of the risk associated with a portfolio holding, they are willing to let their delegated
portfolios carry higher levels of the risky asset than if they were investing directly. Two,
if fund managers are better informed than direct investors, their informational advantage
lowers the risk associated with any given level of holdings of the risky asset. If delegation
results in greater willingness to hold risky assets, it is quite plausible that greater reliance
on delegated investment will lower the required equilibrium risk premium. Empirical
evidence has suggested that the equity risk premium has declined in recent years:3 the
processes described in this paper o®er channels of contributory in°uence. We present
illustrative examples quantifying some of these e®ects in our model.
To keep the model as intuitive as possible we make a number of simplifying assump-
tions. We assume that all fund managers have access to the same (common) information
signal that is correlated with the true future value of the risky asset. This corresponds
to a setting where some market specialists (fund managers) have better information than
outsiders (private or direct investors). This assumption can readily be relaxed to allow
fund managers to have private and heterogeneous information { re°ecting, for instance,
stock picking or market timing skills { but this complicates the algebra without altering
our conclusions. We also assume in the main analysis that fund managers have no wealth
of their own, but relax this assumption in Section 5.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief survey of the related liter-
ature. Sections 2 to 4 describe our model and our principal ¯ndings regarding portfolio
choices and the delegation decision. Section 5 studies the resulting equilibria, including
the implication for the equity premium. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are collected in
the Appendix.
1.1. Related literature
Relative performance evaluation has long been an aspect of contractual relations. Even
when it is not explicitly written into a contract, RPE may be a part of the implicit
agreements that guide long-term remuneration. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) found that
upward revision of CEO salaries tends to be positively related to ¯rms' performance, but
negatively related to industry or market performance as a whole. Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) found positive correlation between the relative performance of funds
(as indicated by their rank in published league tables) and in°ow of new investment funds.
Similarly, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) found a positive, if
3See, for example, Claus and Thomas (2001), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Welch (2000).
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nonlinear, relationship between performance and in°ow of new funds to mutual funds.
Given that management fees are an increasing function of the size of managed funds,
outperforming the market leads to higher rewards in the future.
Holmstrom (1982) was among the ¯rst to argue that relative performance evaluation
(RPE) is valuable if agents face some common uncertainty. To be precise, RPE is useful if
other agents' performance reveals information about an agent's unobservable choices that
cannot be inferred from his own measured performance. Of course, RPE-based contracts
do not always work in the interest of the principals. Within organizations, basing reward
on relative performance creates incentives to sabotage the measured performance of co-
workers, to collude with co-workers, or to self-select into a pool of low ability workers. Dye
(1992) pointed out such contracts may distort choice by persuading managers to select
projects where their relative talent, rather than their absolute talent, is the greatest.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that when ¯rms compete in product markets, use
of high-powered incentives may result in excessive competition: the need to soften the
intensity of competition may induce principals to dilute incentives. And, even when
the net bene¯t of RPE contracts is positive, they may be di±cult to implement, say, if
individual performance (as opposed to team performance) is hard to measure.
Bhattacharya and P°eiderer's (1985) seminal paper on delegated portfolio manage-
ment has been followed by an extensive literature on the impact of the delegation fee
structure on portfolio choice. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Das and Sundaram
(2002) focus on the di®erences between symmetric, `fulcrum' contracts (which penalise
under-performance just as they reward out-performance), and asymmetric, `incentive'
contracts (which reward out-performance without penalising under-performance). Our
model focuses on symmetric contracts. Das and Sundaram (1998) point out that sym-
metric contracts have long been mandatory for US mutual funds, though regulatory
exemptions have diluted this requirement to some extent. Indeed, in our model manage-
rial remuneration is a linear function of the performance measures. While linear contracts
are commonly observed in the fund management industry, they may not always be the
optimal class of contracts. See Diamond (1998), among others, for a discussion of this
issue.
Brennan (1993) provides an early attempt to study the general equilibrium impli-
cations of contracts that reward managers according to their performance relative to a
benchmark portfolio. In that spirit, Cuoco and Kaniel (2001) examine the impact of
such RPE contracts on equilibrium prices. As in our model, they have three classes of
agents (`active investors', `fund investors' and `fund managers'), but the proportions of
the three classes are ¯xed exogenously. Their primary purpose is to compare the impact
of symmetric versus asymmetric RPE contracts: they ¯nd that symmetric contracts tilt
portfolio choice towards stocks that are part of the benchmark, while asymmetric con-
tracts lead fund managers to choose portfolios that maximise the variance of their excess
return over the benchmark. These papers do not consider the choice of optimal contract
parameters.
Admati and P°eiderer (1997) do look at the issue of optimal contract parameters in
such contexts. They question the usefulness of benchmark-adjusted compensation: they
¯nd that such schemes are generally inconsistent with optimal risk sharing or with the
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goal of obtaining the optimal portfolio for the delegating investor. Our model di®ers from
theirs in some crucial, and signi¯cant, respects. In their model, the decision to delegate
is taken as given. Further, the expected return to assets is given exogenously (i.e., they
do not allow for the possibility that investment choices made by fund managers a®ect the
equilibrium return distribution). Three, in their model, relative performance is measured
relative to a \passive" benchmark, such as a stock market index. Indeed, Admati and
P°eiderer themselves highlight these limitations of their model, and make the case for a
model along the lines we present here. In our model, the benchmark is the average return
of active fund managers, and thus is endogenous. We consider the equilibrium outcome,
where relative returns are determined endogenously. We ¯nd that relative performance
evaluation has a more benign e®ect, in that it is not incompatible with optimal portfolio
selection.
2. The Model
2.1. Preferences and delegation
To isolate the e®ects of performance-based contracts on the asset market equilibrium,
we study a simple two-period model of portfolio choice. Time is denoted by t = 0; 1:
There are N investors, each with initial wealth of one unit. An investor can invest his
wealth directly or delegate the investment decision to a fund manager. The delegation
decision is endogenous. Suppose n · N investors choose to delegate their investment (we
denote these as i = 1; 2; : : : ; n); while the remaining N ¡ n investors invest directly. We
assume, for simplicity, that each delegating investor is matched with exactly one fund
manager, so that there are as many fund managers as there are delegating investors. We
also assume, for the moment, that managers have no investible resources of their own,
nor can they borrow to invest.
All agents { investors and fund managers { are risk averse and make choices in order
to maximise the expected utility of their returns. In our model the structure of asset
returns and payo®s are such that individual returns are normally distributed. We assume
that all agents have utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion, possibly with
di®erent degrees of risk aversion. Under these assumptions, expected utility depends on
the mean and variance of an agent's payo®. Given random payo® ~w; agent j's utility is
given as
Vj( ~w) = E( ~w)¡ ½j
2
V ar( ~w); (1)
where ½j > 0 is the individual's coe±cient of absolute risk aversion.
Agents allocate their wealth across two assets, namely risk-free bonds and risky equity
shares. There is an unlimited supply of bonds, with risk-free rate of return r > 0. The
aggregate supply of equity shares is ¯xed at Q > 0. The return on equity depends on its
¯nal price ~P1, which is normally distributed, and its initial price P0, which is determined
endogenously in our model.
Consider an arbitrary portfolio that allocates one unit of wealth across equity and
bonds. If it holds ¸ shares acquired at price P0 per share and invests the rest in bonds, its
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value in the ¯nal period is ¸ ~P1+(1¡¸P0)r: It simpli¯es the analysis if we express the value
of the portfolio as a function of the excess return of equities over bonds, ~K(P0) ´ ~P1¡P0r.
The value of the portfolio can then be written as
~W = ¸ ~K + r: (2)
Agents' payo®s depend on portfolio choices. Fund managers are remunerated on the
basis of their absolute performance and their performance relative to other active fund
managers. Let ~Wi be the ¯nal value of investor i's holdings, whether direct or dele-
gated. De¯neW = 1n
Pn
i=1
~Wi to be the average ¯nal value of all professionally-managed
portfolios. The i¡th fund manager's remuneration is linear (or, to be precise, a±ne)
~Rm(i) = Ii + ai ~Wi + bi( ~Wi ¡W ): (3)
Here Ii ¸ 0 is a ¯xed component, independent of the fund's performance. The coe±cient
ai ¸ 0 ties remuneration to the absolute performance of the fund and bi ¸ 0 ties it to
its relative performance. Note that relative performance is measured in relation to the
performance of active fund managers, rather than to the market as a whole or to any
other pre-speci¯ed benchmark. Using the average performance of active fund managers
as the benchmark creates the possibility of strategic interaction in fund managers' choice.
The return to delegating investor i is the value of the delegated portfolio net of the
manager's remuneration
~Rd(i) = ~Wi ¡ ~Rm(i): (4)
The contract parameters, (Ii; ai; bi); determine the division of the ¯nal portfolio value
between fund managers and delegating investors. In our model delegating investors
choose these parameters to align the interests of their fund manager with their own
objectives. Delegation contracts are subject to a participation constraint: fund managers
will accept a delegation contract only if the expected utility of the contract is no less
than their reservation utility. For simplicity, we assume that all fund managers have the
same reservation utility, Ám ¸ 0; this is easily relaxed: Thus, incentive compatibility and
participation constraints will jointly a®ect the choice of Ii; ai and bi.
Investors who invest directly on their own account obtain the full value of their
portfolio
~Ro(i) = ~Wi: (5)
Investors may yet prefer costly delegation if they expect that fund managers can make
better-informed choices on their behalf. We describe this next.
2.2. Information Structure
All agents have a common prior distribution over the ¯nal price of the risky asset. Prior
to making the portfolio choice, but after entering any delegation contract, each agent
receives a signal. We assume that obtaining the signal incurs no cost or e®ort: this
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allows us to abstract from any moral hazard in the problem. Fund managers receive
signals that are more informative than those received by investors. An investor will
choose to delegate if the informational advantage of fund managers is strong enough
to compensate for the cost of delegation. We develop this idea in an environment in
which all fund managers receive identical signals. Investors receive signals that are less
informative than those of fund managers, and their precision varies across investors. It is
natural to expect that investors with relatively imprecise information will be more likely
to delegate.
To formalise this, we assume that the prior distribution of the price of equity in the
¯nal period is known by all to be
~P1 = ¹P1 + ~"; where ~" » N(0; ¾2"):
Before making their portfolio choices, fund managers observe a common signal ~s
~s = ~"+ ~u; where ~u » N(0; ¾2m); and E(~"~u) = 0:
De¯ne ®m ´ ¾
2
m
¾2"+¾
2
m
; this re°ects the noise or imprecision of the signal. Its value lies be-
tween 0 and 1, with lower values indicating a more informative set of signals. Together,
®m and ~S specify the common information structure of all fund managers. It is straight-
forward to show that, conditional on receiving a signal ~s, the posterior distribution of
~P1 has mean and variance
E[ ~P1j~s] = ¹P1 + (1¡ ®m)~s; (6)
V ar( ~P1j~s) = ®m¾2" : (7)
Investors have heterogeneous information structures. Investor i gets a signal ~zi
~zi = ~"+ ~vi; where ~vi » N(0; ¾2i ) and E(~"~vi) = 0:
De¯ne ®i =
¾2i
¾2"+¾
2
i
to re°ect the imprecision of investor i's signal. Together with the set
of signals ~Zi, it de¯nes the information structure for investor i: Conditional on signal ~zi;
the posterior distribution has mean and variance
E[ ~P1j~zi] = ¹P1 + (1¡ ®i)~zi; (8)
V ar( ~P1j~zi) = ®i¾2" : (9)
We assume that ¾2m < ¾
2
i for all i: It follows directly that ®m < ®i: This assumption cap-
tures the reasonable idea that professional managers are better informed than individual
investors. Without this assumption there would be no role for active fund management
in our model.
2.3. Equilibrium
Given this structure, an asset market equilibrium can be de¯ned in the usual fashion. We
assume that investors know the distributional properties of fund managers' risk prefer-
ences and information. Investors choose whether or not to delegate, and if they delegate,
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the parameters of their delegation contract. Fund managers choose portfolios that max-
imise the expected utility of their remuneration. Direct investors choose their portfolios
to maximise expected utility.
Let ¸ ´ (¸1; ¸2; : : : ; ¸N )0 be the vector of demand for equity, direct or via delegated
portfolios, for the N investors. Demand depends on the initial price P0: Given the
aggregate demand for equity shares and their ¯xed aggregate supply Q, the price, P0, is
determined through market clearing:
NX
i=1
¸i(P0) = Q: (10)
The equilibrium outcome is subject to the familiar problem of information revelation:
investors may be able to infer information received by fund managers from the equilibrium
price. This problem can be addressed by allowingQ to be random with a su±ciently large
variance to make inference from prices very di±cult. Such randomness in Q might re°ect
the impact of liquidity traders. Ignoring the issue here simpli¯es the algebra without
signi¯cantly a®ecting our results.
To analyse the model, we ¯rst examine the investment choices of direct investors
and fund managers. We then consider the design of optimal remuneration contracts and
optimal delegation. Finally we study the equilibria in some sample economies.
3. Direct Investment
We begin by examining the portfolio choices of investors who invest on their own account.
The return to direct investment is given by
~Ro(i) = ¸ ~K + r: (11)
For any P0, let ¹K(P0) ´ E[ ~K(P0)] = ¹P1 ¡ P0r be the mean value of excess returns, or
the equity risk premium. We have the following result:
Proposition 1 Consider an investor i with coe±cient of absolute risk aversion ½i and
information structure (®i; ~Zi): If this investor chooses to invest directly, the optimal port-
folio demand conditional on receiving signal ~zi is
¸¤o(i) =
¹K + (1¡ ®i)~zi
½i®i¾2"
: (12)
The ex-ante expected utility of direct investment is
Vo(i) =
¹K2 + (1¡ ®i)¾2"
2½i®i¾2"
+ r: (13)
The demand for equity is standard for the assumed mean-variance structure of pref-
erences. Equity holding is increasing in ¹K + (1 ¡ ®i)~zi, which is the expected value of
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~K conditional on signal ~zi. Demand is decreasing in the risk aversion parameter ½i and
in the conditional variance ®i¾
2
" : Note that we have not ruled out short sales as these do
not a®ect our results in any signi¯cant way. The expression for ex-ante expected utility
of direct investment obtains by computing the expected utility for each signal and then
aggregating across ~Zi; the set of signals.
4. Delegation
We analyse delegation in three steps. First, we consider a fund manager's portfolio
choice for an arbitrary remuneration contract. Next we compute the value of a delegation
contract to the delegating investor, allowing us to address the choice of optimal contract
parameters. We can then consider the delegation decision by comparing the value of the
optimally-chosen delegation contract with the value of direct investment. For tractability
we assume that all fund managers have the same degree of risk aversion, ½m.
4.1. Manager's choice conditional on signal s
Given a contract (Ii; ai; bi), a fund manager chooses the portfolio to maximise expected
utility of remuneration, ~Rm(i). Relative performance evaluation makes each manager's
remuneration sensitive to contracts of rival fund managers. To capture this dependence,
we de¯ne C =
nP
j=1
1
(aj+bj)
, and D =
nP
j=1
aj
(aj+bj)
:4 We have the following result:
Lemma 1 Consider a fund manager with risk aversion ½m; information structure (®m; ~S);
and remuneration contract (Ii; ai; bi). Conditional on receiving a signal ~s, his optimal
portfolio demand is
¸m(i) =
·
D + biC
D(ai + bi)
¸ · ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
: (14)
The ex-ante expected utility of a delegation contract to the fund manager is
Vm(i) = Ii + air +
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
2½m®m¾2"
: (15)
As with direct investment, the fund manager's equity holding is increasing in the
conditional mean of ~K, and is decreasing in its conditional variance and in ½m. Further,
demand for equity di®ers across fund managers according to di®erences in the (relative)
weights on relative versus absolute performance in their contracts (i.e., as bi=ai di®ers).
If we de¯ne ¸m =
1
n
Pn
j=1 ¸m(j) as the average equity holding in delegated portfolios, we
have
¸
¤
m(~s) =
C
D
· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
: (16)
4The arguments that follow assume that aj > 0 for at least one delegating investor. This ensures
that D > 0: In the absence of this assumption, it can be shown that the equilibrium risk premium is
necessarily zero; if so, costly delegation is not rational.
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Lemma 1 also computes the value of the contract to the fund manager by aggregating the
expected utility of signal-contingent choices. As we might expect, the fund manager's ex-
pected utility is increasing in ai and Ii. Quite remarkably, the value of the linear contract
to the fund manager does not depend directly on the relative performance parameter bi.
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To understand this, note that while fund managers' portfolio choices are sensitive to RPE,
the incentive e®ects of changing bi are undone by the changes in the portfolio chosen by
the fund manager. This conclusion echoes similar ¯ndings in Stoughton (1993) and Ad-
mati and P°eiderer (1997). Indeed, while Lemma 1 establishes this for the mean-variance
utility function entertained here, the result is valid for any concave utility function that
fund managers might have.
4.2. The return to delegated investment and optimal delegation contracts
The return to delegated investment is the value of the portfolio net of the manager's
remuneration: ~Rd(i) = ~Wi¡ ~Rm(i): It depends on the remuneration contract parameters
and the associated portfolio choices made by the fund manager. As the latter may depend
on rival fund managers' contracts, so would the net return from delegation. The value
of a delegation contract to the delegating investor is given by the following Lemma. For
ease of notation, we de¯ne Mi =
D(1¡ai¡bi)+biC
(ai+bi)D
:
Lemma 2 Consider an investor with risk aversion ½i who delegates investment to a fund
manager with risk aversion ½m using a contract (Ii; ai; bi). The ex-ante expected utility
of the net return to the delegating investor is
Vd(i)(Ii; ai; bi) = (1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii +
· ¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
¸ ·
1¡ ½i
2½m
Mi
¸
Mi: (17)
Each delegating investor chooses the contract parameters to maximise Vd(i). Of
course, a fund manager will willingly accept a remuneration contract only if the expected
value of the contract, Vm(i), exceeds his reservation utility Ám: Thus, each delegating
investor must choose (ai; bi; Ii) to maximise Vd(i), subject to the following participation
constraint
Ii + air +
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
2½m®m¾2"
¸ Ám; (18)
and the conditions that ai ¸ 0; bi ¸ 0; and Ii ¸ 0:
Note that the objective function, Vd(i); depends on the contract parameters Ii and ai
directly, and on bi through the termMi : The participation constraint depends only on Ii
and ai: The existence of a lower bound on Ii creates the possibility that the participation
constraint may not bind, say, for Ám small enough. Indeed, since Ii has no in°uence
on portfolio choice, optimal contracts will assign it the lowest possible value when the
participation constraint does not bind. The following Lemma describes the structure of
the optimal contract.
5The parameter bi, along with the contract parameters of rival fund managers, may a®ect the fund
manager's utility through the equilibrium value of ¹K; but this e®ect is indirect.
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Lemma 3 Consider an investor with risk aversion ½i choosing a contract (Ii; ai; bi) to
delegate the investment decision to a fund manager with risk aversion ½m:
(i) If the participation constraint binds, the optimal contract chooses ai and bi so that
Mi =
½m
½i
and Ii is set so that the participation constraint just binds.
(ii) If the participation constraint does not bind, the optimal contract sets Ii = 0; ai
= D=C; and bi satis¯es
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
µ
½i
½m
1¡ ai
ai
¡ 1
¶µ
1
ai
¶µ
1
ai + bi
¶
= r: (19)
Lemma 3 shows that when the participation constraint binds, the optimal Mi aligns
the fund manager's choices to the risk preferences of the delegating investor { speci¯cally,
it corrects for any divergence between ½i and ½m { while the choice of Ii > 0 ensures
that the participation constraint is satis¯ed. Since Mi depends on both ai and bi, the
optimality condition does not determine these parameters uniquely. The relationship
between optimal ai and bi is complicated.
6 As we shall see, under a binding participation
constraint relative performance evaluation does not serve any essential purpose: any
outcome achieved by positive values of bi can be replicated by a suitable choice of ai:
When the participation constraint does not bind, the restriction that Ii be non-
negative imposes a binding constraint on the contract. The unconstrained optimum
would have chosen a negative value for Ii; but the non-negativity constraint makes that
choice inadmissible. The participation constraint does not bind here because the con-
straint Ii ¸ 0 does. To understand the properties of this constrained optimum, let
(a^i; b^i) denote a solution to equation (19) for a given ¹K: The requirement that a^i = D=C
implies that the optimal weight on absolute performance is the same for all delega-
tion contracts that are constrained-optimal. Any heterogeneity in delegating investors'
risk preferences ½i must then be accommodated through di®erences in the choice of b^i.
Also, while D=C (and hence, a^i) may be ¯xed from a single investor's perspective, the
restrictions on the optimal contract are compatible with multiple solutions (a^i; b^i); cor-
responding to di®erent values for D=C: Lastly, it follows from equation (19), that b^i is
decreasing in a^i: optimal contracts that place greater emphasis on absolute performance
place lower weight on relative performance.7
Proposition 2 examines the implications of these contract structures for fund man-
agers' portfolio choices.
Proposition 2 Consider an investor with risk aversion ½i who delegates the investment
to a fund manager with risk aversion ½m using optimally-chosen contract parameters.
6It can be shown that, if the participation constraint binds for all delegating investors, the optimal
ai is increasing (decreasing) in bi for investors whose risk aversion is above (below) the average for all
delegating investors.
7To see why, note that for (19) to hold at r > 0, ai > 0, and bi ¸ 0; we must have ½i½m
1¡ai
ai
¡ 1 > 0:
Evaluating @bi
@ai
for this range of values proves the claim.
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The optimal portfolio choice of the fund manager is
¸¤m(i) =
µ
1
½i
+
1
½m
¶· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
®m¾2"
¸
(20)
if the participation constraint binds, and
¸¤m(i) =
1
a^i
1
½m
· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
®m¾2"
¸
= ¸
¤
m (21)
if the participation constraint does not bind. Demand is higher when the participation
constraint does not bind.
Proposition 2 shows how constraints in the design of optimal delegation contracts
a®ect portfolio choice under delegation. When participation constraints for fund man-
agers bind, equation (20) shows that demand for equity in delegated portfolios depends,
ultimately, on the risk aversion of the delegating investor and the fund manager. The
choice of performance parameters does not really matter here because all combinations
of ai and bi that are consistent with optimality lead to the same level of demand. The
e®ect of delegation on the willingness to hold the risky asset is easy to see. Delegation
allows better-informed fund managers to choose on behalf of less-informed investors, ef-
fectively expanding the information held by the average market participant. Recall that,
for simplicity, we have assumed that managers have no investment resources of their own,
so that here delegation also increases the population of individuals willing to hold the
risky asset, directly or indirectly.8
When the participation constraint does not bind (i.e., a binding non-negativity con-
straint on Ii makes the delegation contracts only constrained-optimal), varying the per-
formance parameters does a®ect the demand for equity. Here increased weight on relative
performance (i.e., a higher value of b^i) implies lower weight on absolute performance (as
a^i must fall to maintain constrained-optimality). Equation (21) shows demand for equity
to be decreasing in a^i; thus, demand increases as the weight on relative performance
increases. Further, as the last part of Proposition 2 shows, demand for equity is higher
when the delegation contract is only constrained-optimal: here delegation increases de-
mand for equity beyond that suggested by its information-enhancing feature. This, as
we see later, has marked implications for the equilibrium equity premium.
The two cases also di®er in the pattern of equity holdings across investors. With
optimal linear contracts, heterogeneity in delegating investors' risk aversion will lead
to heterogeneity in portfolio holdings. While RPE creates a general tendency to herd,
the optimal choice of contract parameters re-aligns fund managers' choices to investors'
preferences, mitigating the tendency. In contrast, constrained-optimal contracts display
8Even when fund managers have some wealth of their own, delegation would increase the willingness
to hold the risky asset: equity in delegated portfolios would be the sum of what fund managers would
hold on their own account and what direct investors would have held if they were as well informed as
fund managers.
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identical a^i inducing fund managers to herd: with similar risk aversion and information
as assumed here, they hold identical portfolios.
The tendency to herd in the presence of RPE-based contracts has been noted ex-
tensively in the literature, both empirical and theoretical. Empirical evidence reported
by Thomas and Tonks (2000) suggests that UK pension funds are \closet" trackers.
They found similar patterns of returns in a large sample of more than 2000 segregated
UK pension funds. At the theoretical level, Maug and Naik (1996) model a situation in
which RPE contracts can induce fund managers to ignore their own superior information.
Herding may also be the consequence of strategic interaction (Eichberger et al (1999)),
to protect loss of reputation (Scharfstein and Stein (1990)), or due to free-riding in the
information acquisition process. Our model abstracts from heterogeneity in information
among fund managers. In our setting, herding is a consequence of potential constraints
in optimal contract design.
4.3. The delegation decision
Delegation is rational for an investor if and only if utility from the optimal delegation
contract exceeds the value of direct investment. To assess this, we begin by evaluating
the utility of the optimal delegation contract for delegating investors.
Proposition 3 Consider an investor with coe±cient of risk aversion ½i who delegates
the investment to a fund manager with risk aversion ½m and reservation utility Ám.
If the participation constraint binds, the ex-ante expected utility of return to delegated
investment equals
Vd(i) =
µ
1
½i
+
1
½m
¶· ¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
2®m¾2"
¸
+ r ¡ Ám: (22)
If the participation constraint does not bind the ex-ante expected utility is
Vd(i) =
1
½m
1¡ a^i
a^i
·
1¡ ½i
2½m
1¡ a^i
a^i
¸ · ¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
®m¾2"
¸
+ (1¡ a^i)r: (23)
Propositions 1 and 3 allow us to describe the condition for rational delegation, by
comparing Vd(i) with Vo(i): It aids intuition to express the condition in terms of `risk
tolerances' { the inverse of the coe±cients of risk aversion { so that we write ¿i =
1
½i
and ¿m =
1
½m
. Comparing (13) and (22), for the case where the participation constraint
binds, rational delegation requires
(¿i + ¿m)
· ¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
2®m¾2"
¸
+ r ¡ Ám ¸ ¿i
· ¹K2 + (1¡ ®i)¾2"
2®i¾2"
¸
+ r ,
or equivalently
¹K2 + ¾2"
2¾2"
·
¿i
®m
¡ ¿i
®i
+
¿m
®m
¸
¸ Ám + ¿m
2
: (24)
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Since ®m < ®i; the left hand side is positive, so delegation is rational if Ám is not too large.
Further, the gain from delegation is higher for investors with noisier signals (i.e., greater
®i) and those with greater risk tolerance (higher ¿i). Lastly, the gain from delegation
is increasing in ¹K: other things being the same, higher values of the equilibrium risk
premium will support greater delegation.9 We turn next to the determination of this
premium.10
5. Equilibrium
Asset market equilibrium requires that aggregate demand for equity equal the supply, Q.
Aggregate demand includes demand from direct investors and demand from delegated
portfolios, which are both functions of the equity premium, ¹K(P0): The equity premium
also a®ects the extent of delegation: given that the number of delegating investors is
denoted by n, we have n = n( ¹K): The market clearing condition is
n(K)X
i=1
¸¤m(i)( ¹K) +
NX
i=n(K)+1
¸¤o(i)( ¹K) = Q: (25)
As demand is sensitive to the signals received by investors and fund managers, it is
possible that the market does not clear for very extreme realizations of the signals.11
We discuss the issue of existence for the case where signals take values that are not too
extreme.
While the two categories of demand { direct and delegated { are both increasing and
continuous in ¹K , they di®er in levels. We know, from Propositions 1 and 2, that direct
investment portfolios hold
¸¤o(i) =
1
½i
· ¹K + (1¡ ®i)~zi
®i¾2"
¸
;
9Similarly, we could compare (13) and (23) to obtain a condition for rational delegation when the
participation constraint does not bind. The delegation condition simpli¯es to
¿m
®m
·
¹K2 + ¾2"
2¾2"
¡ ®m
2
¸ ·
2¡ ¿m
¿i
1¡ a^i
a^i
¸
1¡ a^i
a^i
¸ ¿i
®i
·
¹K2 + ¾2"
2¾2"
¡ ®i
2
¸
+ a^ir:
Once again the incentive to delegate is higher for investors with noisier signals and greater risk tolerance.
10Our model ignores the possibility of partial delegation. When binding non-negativity constraints re-
strict delegating investors to choosing constrained-optimal contracts, delegating only part of their wealth
may allow them to circumvent the binding non-negativity constraint, at least for some parameter con¯gu-
rations. However, the gain from moving to fully optimal contracts for the delegated part of the investment
must be traded against the ine±ciency of investing the rest directly, with inferior information, so that
it will not in general be optimal to circumvent the non-negativity constraint entirely. Our model can be
extended to incorporate this, losing some simplicity in the process, and without a®ecting the qualitative
arguments. See also the related discussion on `coordination' in Admati and P°eiderer (1997).
11If ~s ¿ ~zi; delegated portfolios may hold less than direct investment portfolios, so that greater
delegation at higher ¹K could potentially lower aggregate demand. However, if investors' signals are
noisier versions of the managers' signals, by the law of large numbers the mean value of the investors'
signals would coincide with ~s:
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while optimally delegated portfolios hold
¸¤m(i) =
µ
1
½i
+
1
½m
¶· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
®m¾2"
¸
when the participation constraint binds. Since ®i > ®m and ½m > 0, it follows that
as long as the conditional equity premium is positive, delegated portfolios hold more
equity than the corresponding direct investment portfolios for similar signals (i.e., for
~s ¼ ~zi). If the participation constraint does not bind, equity holdings are even larger.
Thus, at values of ¹K for which an investor is indi®erent between direct and delegated
investment, the individual's demand for equity has two distinct solutions: we have a
demand correspondence rather than a demand function. In e®ect, there is a discontinuity
in the demand associated with an individual investor, as he switches from direct to
delegated investment. Note, however, that the value of ¹K at which this discontinuity
occurs depends on the individual's risk preference and information structure (speci¯cally,
on ½i and ®i). If the distribution of these parameters is su±ciently dispersed across the
population, the limit average demand may be a continuous function even when individual
demand is a correspondence. This is because at any ¹K only a vanishingly small proportion
of investors display indi®erence between delegation and direct investment.12
Aggregate demand is clearly increasing in ¹K: each category of demand is increasing
in ¹K, and the extent of delegation n( ¹K) is increasing in ¹K; so that higher values of ¹K
place greater weight on higher levels of demand. If aggregate demand is monotone and
`almost continuous', an equilibrium will exist as long as demand varies su±ciently along
the set of feasible prices. If aggregate demand is less than Q when ¹K = 0, and larger
than Q when ¹K is very large, an equilibrium exists. For su±ciently low values of ¹K;
aggregate demand for the risky asset is arbitrarily small, at least for signals close to the
average. The largest value ¹K = P 1 ¡ P0r can take (assuming P0 is non-negative) is P 1:
We assume that aggregate demand for the risky asset exceeds its supply Q at this price.
Then the usual ¯xed point arguments can establish the existence of a unique equilibrium.
5.1. Implications for the equity risk premium
The ¯nding that delegated portfolios have larger holdings of the risky asset has direct
implications for the equity risk premium. Parameter changes that a®ect the extent of
delegation will alter the equilibrium premium. For instance, an improvement in the preci-
sion of fund managers' signals relative to that of investors' signals increases the incentive
12Heterogeneity is not essential as a standard convexi¯cation argument for aggregate demand can
be applied instead. Suppose that at some K, each investor is indi®erent between direct investment and
delegation, so that his demand takes one of two distinct values, ¸x(i)(K) 2 f¸o(i)(K); ¸m(i)(K)g: Suppose
there are n investors: if we place n1 · n investors at ¸o(i)(K) and the rest at ¸m(i)(K), average demand
is
¸ =
n1
n
¸o(i) +
³
1¡ n1
n
´
¸m(i):
As n!1; average demand ¸(K) ¯lls the entire segment between ¸o(i)(K) and ¸m(i)(K) by varying n1.
This, in e®ect, makes aggregate demand continuous even when individual demand is not.
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to delegate. Given that delegated portfolios have comparatively higher demand for eq-
uity, this change will be associated with a lower equity risk premium at the equilibrium.13
Example 1 below illustrates this e®ect.
Apart from the e®ect through changing delegation levels, the equity premium may
depend on the structure of delegation contracts. When investors can choose the contract
optimally, demand for equity, and hence the equilibrium equity premium, does not depend
on the contract parameters. However, there is a real possibility that non-negativity con-
straints on Ii may restrict the feasible set of contracts. The prevalence of actual contracts
based purely on performance (i.e., those with no performance-independent component)
lend some plausibility to this possibility. When contracts are only constrained-optimal,
the choice of contract parameters matters. Lemma 3 tells us that for this case the prob-
lem of designing optimal delegation contracts admits multiple solutions (a^i; b^i): Further,
a^i is decreasing in b^i and demand for equity is decreasing in a^i: Thus, optimal contracts
that place greater emphasis on relative performance evaluation (and correspondingly less
on absolute performance) lead to greater demand for equity. For a ¯xed supply of equity
shares, this greater emphasis on RPE will lead to lower equity premia at the equilibrium.
Example 2 below demonstrates this for a simple case.
The preceding argument can be summarised thus:
Proposition 4 Consider the equity market equilibrium given by equation (25). An in-
crease in the weight on relative performance evaluation does not a®ect the equilibrium
equity premium when investors can choose the linear delegation contract optimally. How-
ever, with constrained-optimal contracts, an increase in relative performance evaluation
tends to reduce the equity premium.
Our model suggests that higher levels of delegation may result in a decline in the
equilibrium risk premium. Empirical evidence (see Claus and Thomas (2001), Fama
and French (2002), and the surveys by Welch (2000), Graham and Harvey (2001)) have
discussed the possibility that the equity risk premium has declined in recent years. Our
model o®ers a tentative and partial explanation of such a tendency.
5.2. Some examples
We illustrate our arguments through some examples. These examples are meant to
demonstrate qualitatively the mechanisms operating in our model and not to suggest
their likely magnitude. We use a special case of the information structure described
above: we assume that signals observed by investors are noisier versions of the signal
received by fund managers:
~zi = ~s+ ~xi;
where ~xi » N(0; ¾2xi) and E(~s~xi) = 0:
13The ¯nding that better information raises prices through a reduction in the riskiness of asset payo®s
has { in the context of ¯rm spino®s { also been pointed out by Habib, Johnsen and Naik (1997). Here
we show how this leads to lower equilibrium risk premia.
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For this case, ®i =
¾2m+¾
2
xi
¾2"+¾
2
m+¾
2
xi
. Note that, with this structure, fund managers' signals
are more precise than those of investors as long as ¾2xi > 0. We compute the equilibria
assuming each agent receives the average signal, i.e., ~s = 0; ~zi = 0:
5.2.1. Example 1
Consider, ¯rst, an example in which the equilibrium outcome involves binding participa-
tion constraints for fund managers. Here investor i's demand for equity is
¸i =
8<:
¿i+¿m
®m
³
K
¾2"
´
under delegated investment
¿i
®i
³
K
¾2"
´
under direct investment
:
Investors' coe±cients of risk aversion are important in two regards. First, they determine
the economy's capacity for carrying risk and hence matter directly to the risk premium.
Second, together with the degree of informational asymmetry across investors and fund
managers, investors' risk aversion determines whether they choose to delegate (see equa-
tion (24)). Risk-tolerant and poorly-informed investors are more likely to delegate than
risk-averse, well-informed ones.
Consider the following numerical example. We assume that all investors and fund
managers have the same constant absolute risk aversion of 3.3 (i.e., ¿i = 0:3 for all i, and
¿m = 0:3) but di®er in the precision of their signals. We set ¾
2
" = 0:04, i.e. ¾" = 0:20;
corresponding to market volatility of 20% { a level consistent with typical annual volatility
in the US stock market. Let the variance of the noise in the fund manager's signal be
¾2m = 0:2 so the R
2 of a regression of returns on manager information is 0.16, a value not
out of line with empirical evidence on predictability of stock returns. Assume that half
the population of investors have relatively noisy information given by ¾2x1 = 0:6; while
the rest have ¾2x2 = 0:2, corresponding to R
2{ values of 0.05 and 0.09, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we set the average number of shares per investor at 1. If the
reservation utility of fund managers Ám is set at 0.075 in these units, type-1 investors
choose to delegate, type-2 investors invest directly, and the equilibrium equity premium
is ¹K = 0:076, or 7.6%. At this premium, average equity holdings are 0.56 units for direct
investors and 1.44 units for fund managers.
It is easy to check that an increase in the extent of delegation would lower this pre-
mium. If the fraction of investors with relatively imprecise information rises to two-thirds,
the equilibrium equity premium declines to 6.8%. This decline is clearly a consequence
of greater delegation: in a model without any delegation, an increase in the average
imprecision of information would raise the equity premium.
5.2.2. Example 2
In our second example the parameter values are such that all investors delegate at the
equilibrium and fund managers' participation constraints do not bind. As before, we
set ¾2" = 0:04. Let ¾
2
m = 0:12, ¾
2
xi = 0:6 for all investors and let ¿i = ¿m = 0:2. We
set the interest rate r at 5% and reservation utility at Ám = 0:04: When participation
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constraints do not bind, the choice of optimal contract parameters is given by equation
(19). For any chosen value of bi, this equation along with the market clearing equation
can be solved for a^i and ¹K: In each case we check that delegation is optimal and that
the participation constraint is non-binding at the equilibrium.
If we set bi = 0; the equilibrium equity premium is 7.1%. Increasing the weight on
relative performance to bi = 0:5 reduces the equity premium to 6.8%; raising it further
to bi = 0:9 reduces the equity premium to 6.5%. In this example, greater emphasis on
relative performance has de¯nite implications for the equity premium.
5.2.3. Example 3
Introducing some heterogeneity among investors, so that not all delegate at the equi-
librium, can demonstrate larger reductions in the equity premium. Our third example
studies the e®ect of varying the proportion of delegating investors, once again in an envi-
ronment where participation constraint do not bind. As in example 2, we set ¾2" = 0:04,
¾2m = 0:12, ¿m = 0:2, r = 0:05; Ám = 0:04 and Q = 1. We now assume that there are
two groups of investors: the ¯rst have ¾2x1 = 0:4 and ¿1 = 0:6, while the second group
have ¾2x2 = 0:2 and ¿2 = 0:2. The ¯rst group of investors, with relatively noisy signals
and high risk tolerance, chooses to delegate while the second group ends up investing
directly at the equilibrium. At the chosen parameter values, this separation of choices {
that the ¯rst group delegates while the second group does not { holds for a wide range
of values of the equity premium. This is important because the equity premium varies
considerably as the proportion of the two groups is varied parametrically. We choose
bi = 0:5 and solve for a^i and ¹K from the market-clearing condition and equation (19).
When the ¯rst group constitutes 30% of the population { corresponding to relatively
low levels of delegation { the equity premium is 8.05%. The premium falls to 5.85%
when the proportion of delegating investors is raised to 50%. Further increasing this
proportion to 80% leads to an equity premium of 4.12%, suggesting that delegation has
a sizeable e®ect on the mean return on the risky asset.
5.3. Allowing managers to have wealth: an extension
Our model and numerical simulations assume that fund managers have no wealth of their
own. The results can readily be adapted to accommodate this possibility. Suppose there
are N investors, each with one unit of wealth, and potentially N fund managers each
with q ¸ 0 units of wealth. Portfolio choice for the n delegating investors is now made
by fund managers who combine delegated funds with their own funds to invest 1 + q
units of wealth. A fund manager's payo® now has two components: delegation fees for
the managed portfolio and a share of the portfolio itself, in proportion to his private
investment. The remaining N ¡ n investors and potential fund managers invest their
own wealth directly.
Generalisation of the previous analysis leads to the following results. If delegation
does not happen, holdings of the direct investors, ¸¤o(i); and the private holdings of po-
tential fund managers, denoted as ¸¤mo(i), evaluated at the expected value of their signals,
add up to
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¸¤o(i) + ¸
¤
mo(i) =
µ
1
½i
1
®i
+
1
½m
1
®m
¶ ¹K
¾2"
: (26)
Equity holdings in delegated portfolios, also evaluated at the expected value of the man-
agers' signals, depend on whether the participation constraint binds:
¸¤m(i) =
8<:
³
1
½i
+ 1½m
´
1
®m
¹K
¾2"
if the participation constraint binds
1
½m
³
1+q
a^i+q
´
1
®m
¹K
¾2"
if it does not
(27)
In the latter case, delegation parameters must satisfy the following generalisation of
condition (19)
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
µ
½i
½m
1¡ ai
q + ai
¡ 1
¶µ
1 + q
ai + q
¶µ
1
q + ai + bi
¶
= r:
The modi¯ed condition for rational delegation is straightforward to specify. The market
clearing equation is now written as
nX
i=1
¸¤m(i) +
NX
i=n+1
h
¸¤o(i) + ¸
¤
mo(i)
i
= Q: (28)
We next examine the e®ect of this modi¯cation on our numerical results¡in particular
on the relationship between delegation and the equilibrium equity premium. Let us recon-
sider Example 1, where delegation contracts involved binding participation constraints.
Comparing equations (26) and (27), we ¯nd that variations in the level of delegation
now a®ect holdings of the risky asset only to the extent that delegation allows managers
to make more informed choices on behalf of delegating investors. If so, higher levels of
delegation still reduce the equilibrium equity premium but the e®ect is less pronounced
than in Example 1.
When participation constraints do not bind, as in Example 3, our ¯nding that dele-
gation can lower the equilibrium equity premium is again robust. Recalibrating Example
3 under the assumption that managers' wealth equals 10% of investors' wealth (that is,
q = 0:1) and setting the relative performance parameter at bi = 0:5 we ¯nd that, as the
proportion of delegating investors varies, say from 30% to 70%, the equity premium falls
from 5.8% to 4.2%. The reduction is not as dramatic as in Example 3, but signi¯cant
nonetheless. In general, if fund managers' own wealth is small relative to the delegated
funds they receive, the impact of delegation on their portfolio choices { and, hence, on
the equity premium { is likely to be more signi¯cant. Managers typically hold portfolios
far greater than the value of their own assets so that our assumed parameter values are
not implausible.
Lastly, a simple thought experiment may help to further understand the role of del-
egation contracts in the presence of manager wealth.
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5.3.1. Example 4
We set the parameter values as in Example 3. We assume that half the population con-
sists of potential managers, each with q = 0:1 units of wealth. The other half consists
of investors with one unit of wealth each: half the investors are type 1 and the other
half are type 2. We compute equilibrium risk premia corresponding to three scenarios.
In the ¯rst scenario money management is prohibited so that all agents are forced to
invest directly. We ¯nd that the risk premium would be 11.3% for our chosen param-
eters. In the second scenario, we have delegation along the lines discussed in Example
3: investors of type 1 delegate, while investors of type 2 (and fund managers without
access to delegated funds) invest directly. This results in a risk premium of 5.7%. The
third scenario considers a hypothetical economy in which investors of type 1 are given
the fund manager's information signal and then trade on their own. In this scenario the
risk premium would be 10.3%. Since the information sets are equivalent in the latter
two scenarios, comparing risk premia in these scenarios helps us appreciate the extent to
which the delegation contract itself matters for the risk premium.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we aim to explore the equilibrium consequences of performance-based
contracts for fund managers. We consider an extremely simple model, with two time
periods and two assets. Investors can invest directly or delegate their portfolio choice
to better-informed fund managers. We examine linear remuneration contracts, allowing
fund managers' remuneration to depend on the absolute performance of funds and their
performance relative to other actively-managed funds. The structure of managers' re-
muneration contracts is endogenously determined, albeit within the restricted class of
contracts that are linear in the performance measures. At the equilibrium, the extent
of investment delegation and the equity premium are jointly determined. Characteriz-
ing the equilibrium in a model with endogenous contracts is generally very complicated.
Specializing the analysis to the case where all agents have CARA utility functions al-
lows us to solve explicitly for the equilibrium and to investigate the dependence of the
equilibrium risk premium on the parameters of the remuneration contracts.
We ¯nd that delegation in and of itself has an e®ect on asset market equilibrium:
given that fund managers are better informed than investors, delegated portfolios hold
more risky assets than direct investment portfolios. Separately from this, the structure of
remuneration contracts { in particular the relative emphasis they place on absolute versus
relative performance { may a®ect the outcome. Whether or not it does critically depends
on whether the chosen linear contract is fully-optimal or only constrained-optimal. With
fully-optimal contracts, portfolio choices are independent of how the reward for perfor-
mance is distributed between absolute and relative performance. However, when the
set of feasible contracts is restricted { speci¯cally, if the choice of the performance-
independent component faces a binding non-negativity constraint, so that the chosen
contract is only constrained-optimal { relative performance evaluation matters. One, it
creates a tendency to herd. Two, greater weight on relative performance implies a lower
weight on absolute performance, and as Example 2 illustrates, a lower equity premium.
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Example 4 shows that delegation has an e®ect on the equity premium beyond that due to
the di®erence in investors' and fund managers' information. That is, the equity premium
di®ers in an economy with delegation compared to one where direct investors were given
the same information as fund managers. Our ¯ndings suggest that more widespread use
of delegation contracts and greater reliance on relative performance evaluation could have
contributed to the recently observed decline in equilibrium equity premia.
Our model is quite simple, especially in how we model the agency relationship be-
tween investors and fund managers. We focus the agency problem purely on portfolio
choice. The problem of designing optimal contracts could be augmented to address is-
sues of screening managers according to their innate ability, and providing incentives
for them to exert e®ort to improve their information. We could embellish the model by
considering multiple risky assets.14 A more realistic model would allow richer possibil-
ities for matching investors to fund managers, including the possibility that a manager
may handle multiple funds, or that investors may use multiple managers. Realistic con-
cerns would also allow for an alternative speci¯cation where fund managers, rather than
investors, choose the contract structure, subject to investors' participation. Manager-
designed fund structures could be concerned with the long-term rewards including those
based on dynamics and character of future investment °ows (see, for instance, Nanda et
al (2000)).
More importantly, despite the appeal of symmetric contracts, it may be worthwhile
to examine contracts other than linear ones. Das and Sundaram (2002) describe a model
in which asymmetric contracts may sometimes be superior from the investors' perspec-
tive. In a related context, Palomino and Prat (2003) ¯nd that, in the presence of limited
liability for fund managers, the optimal contract may be a bonus contract. Lastly, there
are puzzles that our model does not aim to address: for instance, why investors choose
costly delegation despite strong empirical evidence that the average mutual fund under-
performs passive investment. A model addressing this and related questions would need
to account for transaction costs for direct and pooled investments which goes well beyond
the scope of this paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Direct investor i chooses ¸ to maximise expected utility
E[ ~Ro(i)]¡
½i
2
V ar[ ~Ro(i)] = ¸E[ ~K] + r ¡
½i
2
¸2V ar[ ~K]:
The optimal choice conditional on signal ~zi is, using (8) and (9),
¸¤o(i)(zi) =
E[ ~Kj~zi]
½iV ar[ ~Kj~zi]
=
¹K + (1¡ ®i)~zi
½i®i¾2"
:
Evaluating expected utility at this optimal portfolio, we get
¸¤o(i)E[ ~Kj~zi] + r ¡
½i
2
¸¤2o(i)V ar[ ~Kj~zi =
1
2
( ¹K + (1¡ ®i)~zi)2
½i®i¾2"
+ r:
Aggregating this across the set of signals ~Zi and using the relation
E[(K + (1¡ ®i)~zi)2] = ¹K2 + (1¡ ®i)2V ar[~zi]
= ¹K2 + (1¡ ®i)¾2"
the ex-ante value of direct investment is
Vo(i) =
1
2
¹K2 + (1¡ ®i)¾2"
½i®i¾2"
+ r : ¥
Proof of Lemma 1: The manager of fund i maximizes E[ ~Rm(i)]¡ ½m2 V ar[ ~Rm(i)]: De¯ne
¸m =
1
n
Pn
j=1 ¸m(j) as the average equity holding in delegated portfolios. We can then
write
~Rm(i) = Ii + air + [(ai + bi)¸m(i) ¡ bi¸m] ~K:
This has mean and variance
E[ ~Rm(i)] = Ii + air + [(ai + bi)¸m(i) ¡ bi¸m]E[ ~K];
V ar[ ~Rm(i)] = [(ai + bi)¸m(i) ¡ bi¸m]2V ar[ ~K]:
Fund manager i's demand for equity conditional on signal ~s is, using (6) and (7),
¸¤m(i)(~s) =
µ
1
ai + bi
¶
E[ ~Kj~s]
½mV ar[ ~Kj~s]
+
µ
bi
ai + bi
¶
¸m
=
µ
1
ai + bi
¶· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
+
µ
bi
ai + bi
¶
¸m:
Aggregating demand across fund managers, we have
n¸
¤
m(~s) =
· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸ nX
j=1
1
(aj + bj)
+ ¸
¤
m(~s)
nX
j=1
bj
(aj + bj)
:
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Simplifying, and using the de¯ned notation C =
nP
j=1
1
(aj+bj)
, and D =
nP
j=1
aj
(aj+bj)
; average
holdings in delegated portfolios are
¸
¤
m(~s) =
· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
C
D
:
Substituting this in the expression for the optimal portfolio, we have
¸¤m(i)(s) =
·
D + biC
D(ai + bi)
¸ · ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
:
The conditional mean and variance of the manager's remuneration at this optimal port-
folio are
E
h
~Rm(¸
¤
m(i)(~s))
i
= Ii + air + [(ai + bi)¸
¤
m(i)(~s)¡ bi¸
¤
m(~s)]E[ ~Kj~s]
= Ii + air +
[ ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s]2
½m®m¾2"
;
V ar
h
~R(¸¤m(i)(~s))
i
=
h
(ai + bi)¸
¤
m(i)(~s)¡ bi¸m(~s)
i2
V ar[ ~Kj~s]
=
[ ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s]2
½2m®m¾
2
"
;
so that expected utility conditional on signal ~s is
E
h
~Rm(¸
¤
m(i)(~s))
i
¡ ½m
2
V ar
h
~R(¸¤m(i)(~s))
i
= Ii + air +
1
2½m
( ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s)2
®m¾2"
:
Aggregating this across ~S, the ex-ante expected utility of the delegation contract is
Vm(i) = Ii + air +
1
2½m®m¾2"
Es[( ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s)2]
= Ii + air +
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
2½m®m¾2"
: ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: If fund manager i chooses ¸¤m(~s) in response to signal ~s; the
delegating investor's net return is
~Rd(i) = ~Wi ¡ ~Rm(i) =
h
(1¡ ai ¡ bi)¸¤m(~s) + bi¸¤(~s)
i
~K + (1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii:
Using (14) and (16), and the notation Mi =
D(1¡ai¡bi)+biC
(ai+bi)D
; we have
(1¡ ai ¡ bi)¸¤m(~s) + bi¸¤(~s) =Mi
· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
;
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so that the net return for the delegating investor is
~Rd(i) =Mi
· ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
~K + (1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii;
with mean and variance
E[ ~Rd(i)j~s] = Mi
[ ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s]2
½m®m¾2"
+ (1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii;
V ar
h
~Rd(i)j~s
i
=
M2i [
¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s]2
½2m®m¾
2
"
:
The conditional expected utility equals
E[ ~Rd(i)j~s]¡
½i
2
V ar
h
~Rd(i)j~s
i
= (1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii + [
¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s]2
½2m®m¾
2
"
·
1¡ ½i
2½m
Mi
¸
Mi:
Taking expectations across the set of signals, we obtain the ex-ante expected utility of
the contract
Vd(i)(Ii; ai; bi) = (1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii +
· ¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
¸ ·
1¡ ½i
2½m
Mi
¸
Mi: ¥
Proof of Lemma 3: The delegating investor chooses Ii; ai and bi to maximise
(1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii +
· ¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
¸ ·
1¡ ½i
2½m
Mi
¸
Mi
subject to the participation constraint
Ii + air +
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
2½m®m¾2"
¸ Ám
and the constraints that ai ¸ 0; bi ¸ 0 and Ii ¸ 0: Let L be the associated Lagrangean
and µ be the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the participation constraint. The
¯rst-order conditions for the maximum are
@L
@ai
=
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
µ
1¡ ½i
½m
Mi
¶
@Mi
@ai
¡ r + µr · 0
@L
@bi
=
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
µ
1¡ ½i
½m
Mi
¶
@Mi
@bi
· 0
@L
@Ii
= ¡1 + µ · 0
@L
@µ
= Ii + air +
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
2½m®m¾2"
¡ Ám ¸ 0
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with the caveat that, due to complementary slackness, an inequality holds as an equality
if the relevant variable ai; bi; Ii or µ is strictly positive. (The second-order conditions
have been veri¯ed but are tedious to report here).
For strictly positive Ii, the third relation holds as an equality. But then µ = 1; which
is strictly positive so that the participation constraint binds. Also, with strictly positive
ai, the ¯rst relationship holds as an equality, so that µ = 1 and
@Mi
@ai
= ¡(biC+D)
(ai+bi)2D
< 0
ensure that the optimal contract must have M¤i =
½m
½i
. The same outcome obtains for
any con¯guration in which bi is strictly positive.
If the participation constraint does not bind, we have µ = 0; and so Ii = 0. For
outcomes in which both ai and bi are strictly positive and r6= 0, a solution exists only if
@Mi
@bi
= aiC¡D
(ai+bi)2D
= 0, so ai = D=C, and consequently Mi = (1¡ ai)=ai: Using this in the
¯rst-order condition, we can solve for the relationship between optimal bi and ai :
¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
µ
1¡ ½i
½m
1¡ ai
ai
¶µ¡1
ai
¶µ
1
ai + bi
¶
= r:
For outcomes in which only ai is positive, this relation can be solved for the optimal ai,
setting bi = 0: ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 1, fund manager i's equity holdings are
¸¤m(i)(~s) =
·
D + biC
D(ai + bi)
¸
1
½m
µ ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
®m¾2"
¶
:
If the participation constraint binds, the optimal contract has Mi =
D+biC
D(ai+bi)
¡ 1 = ½m½i ;
so that
¸¤m(i)(~s) =
µ
1
½i
+
1
½m
¶µ ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
®m¾2"
¶
:
If the participation constraint does not bind, the optimally-chosen a^i =
D
C and
D+biC
D(ai+bi)
=
1
a^i
; so
¸¤m(i)(~s) =
·
1
a^i
¸ · ¹K + (1¡ ®m)~s
½m®m¾2"
¸
= ¸
¤
m(~s)
Lastly, note that as ½i½m
1¡a^i
a^i
¡1 must be positive to solve (19) for r > 0; a^i > 0 and b^i ¸ 0;
it follows that 1a^i
1
½m
> 1½i +
1
½m
: This implies that the constrained-optimal delegation
contracts lead to higher demand for equity than optimal delegation contracts.¥
Proof of Proposition 3: From Lemma 2, the expected utility of delegating investors
is
Vd(i)(Ii; ai; bi) = (1¡ ai)r ¡ Ii +
· ¹K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
½m®m¾2"
¸ ·
1¡ ½i
2½m
Mi
¸
Mi:
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When the participation constraint binds,Mi =
½m
½i
: Using this, and substituting from the
participation constraint, we get
Vd(i) =
1
2
µ
1
½i
+
1
½m
¶µ
K2 + (1¡ ®m)¾2"
®m¾2"
¶
+ r ¡ Ám:
When the participation constraint does not bind, we have Ii = 0 and Mi =
1¡a^i
a^i
: Evalu-
ating the above expression at these values yields the result ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Follows directly from the arguments in the text. ¥
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